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Modeling selective attention: not just another model of Stroop (NJAMOS)

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Abstract

The Stroop effect has been studied for more than sixty years, and yet it still defies a complete theoretical account. The model presented here offers a new approach that integrates several explanations of the Stroop phenomenon into a hybrid model. Because this model is built within the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), it applies a generic, pre-specified set of mechanisms for learning and performance to the particulars of the Stroop task. Besides fitting a variety of already published experimental results, the model offers the potential to capture strategic variation in what is typically considered a low-level attentional phenomenon. © 2001 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.

Keywords: Cognitive architectures; Selective attention; Stroop task; Hybrid models

1. Modeling selective attention: not just another model of Stroop (NJAMOS)

The Stroop effect has been studied for more than sixty years (Stroop, 1935), and yet it still defies a complete theoretical account. One explanation for the apparent lack of progress is that so much empirical research has been conducted using this basic paradigm that what we now call the ‘Stroop effect’ is actually a compendium of results derived from a multitude of manipulations applied to a family of Stroop-like tasks! The current article focuses on a select set of Stroop results in order to introduce the model NJAMOS. NJAMOS offers a

new theoretical account that integrates several explanations of the Stroop phenomenon into a hybrid model. Specifically, NJAMOS performs competitive, parallel retrieval of information within a goal-based, sequential cognitive processor. NJAMOS is built within the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), so it applies a general, pre-specified set of learning and performance mechanisms to the particulars of the Stroop paradigm. Moreover, NJAMOS is unique among models of (‘low level’) attentional phenomena in that it allows for (‘high level’) strategic variability.

The organization of the paper is as follows. First a description of the Stroop phenomenon is presented. Then, major theoretical features of other computational models are reviewed. Next, the NJAMOS model is described and fit to a selection of relevant

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59 data. Finally, the potential of NJAMOS for accom-
60 modating other results is discussed along with a
61 more general view on evaluating Stroop models.

62 1.1. The basic phenomenon

63 The Stroop effect offers a window onto the
64 processes of selective attention in that stimuli with
65 two prominent dimensions are presented in a task
66 where one dimension must be processed and the
67 other ignored. Typically, the stimuli are words, and
68 the two dimensions are the form of the word and the
69 color of the ink in which it is written. The task, then,
70 is either to name the ink color or to read the word.
71 The basic Stroop manipulation varies the relationship
72 between the meaning of the word and the color of
73 the ink to be congruent (e.g., the word 'red' printed
74 in red ink), conflicting (e.g., the word 'blue' printed
75 in red ink), or neutral (e.g., the word 'dog' or a string
76 of 'X's printed in red ink). A robust result emerges:
77 for color naming, there is interference in the conflict-
78 ing case and (usually) facilitation in the congruent
79 case, but for word reading, there is no (or very little)
80 effect of the congruency of this relationship.


81 Fig. 1 shows a typical data set (along with the
82 NJAMOS predictions to be discussed later). The
83 interference and facilitation in color naming can be
84 seen by the shifts in the color-naming curve as a
85 function of congruency. The lack of such effects for
86 word reading are shown by the relatively flat line for

this condition. These results suggest an asymmetry in
selective attention, namely, that participants are
strongly influenced by the word when naming the ink
color but that they can ignore the ink color when
reading.

2. Theoretical accounts of the Stroop effect

Two different views of the Stroop effect cover
much of the theoretical work in this area. The 'horse-
race' view highlights the overall difference in speed
of processing for words versus colors (see Fig. 1,
separation of the two curves) and assumes a response
bottleneck. This view implies that the pattern of
interference depends on the relative arrival of word
versus color information to the response stage:
whichever kind of information arrives first will
produce interference for the other. Because word
reading is, on average, faster than color naming, this
view predicts the asymmetry of words interfering
with colors but not vice versa.

The other view of the Stroop effect highlights the
different levels of automaticity people have acquired
for processing the two stimulus dimensions. Because
word reading is so highly practiced among typical
Stroop experiment participants, it is more automatic
than color naming. This greater automaticity implies
that reading requires fewer attentional resources and
hence interferes more easily with color naming.



56

57 Fig. 1. Reaction times for standard Stroop experiment. 'Neut1' refers to a string of 'X's in colored ink for color naming and a word printed
58 in black ink for word reading; 'neut2' refers to a non-color word in colored ink for color naming.

115 The key similarity between the two views is that
 116 they both emphasize parallel processing of the two
 117 stimulus dimensions. Not surprisingly, then, the
 118 dominant computational accounts of Stroop phenom-
 119 ena have been implemented within connectionist
 120 models. The key difference between the two views is
 121 whether relative speed or automaticity is considered
 122 the main determiner of interference effects. Note that
 123 manipulations of stimulus-onset-asynchrony (SOA)
 124 alter the timing of processing, predicted to be
 125 important under the horse-race view, and manipula-
 126 tions of practice can alter the automaticity of pro-
 127 cessing that is predicted to be important under the
 128 automaticity view. Thus, experiments that employ
 129 these manipulations are crucial for evaluating spe-
 130 cific theoretical accounts of Stroop phenomena and
 131 hence for evaluating particular computational models
 132 as well.

133 2.1. Existing computational models

134 Three existing computational models will be dis-
 135 cussed. Two of these are connectionist models
 136 (Cohen, Dunbar & McClelland, 1990; Phaf, van der
 137 Heijden & Hudson, 1990), and the other is built as a
 138 production system (Roelofs, 2000). The Cohen et al.
 139 (1990) model was designed to capture an auto-
 140 maticity account of Stroop. It has input nodes that
 141 connect to hidden-layer nodes which connect to
 142 response nodes via either a word-reading or color-
 143 naming pathway. Task-control nodes are connected
 144 to both pathways to ‘gate’ the information processing
 145 in a way that biases towards the instructed task. To
 146 represent the greater automaticity of reading,
 147 stronger weights are given along the word-reading
 148 pathway, making reading the presented word less
 149 sensitive to the congruency relationship of the simul-
 150 taneously presented color than color-naming is to the
 151 congruency relationship of the simultaneously pre-
 152 sented word. The Phaf et al. (1990) model was built
 153 as the Stroop-task extension to a general model of
 154 selective visual attention. This model’s network
 155 architecture differs for word reading and color
 156 naming in that there are direct input–output con-
 157 nections for word reading but not for color naming.
 158 This difference removes the intermediate (hidden
 159 layer) processing for word reading which reduces the

potential for semantically based interference in that
 task.


The Roelofs (2000) model of Stroop phenomena
 is built as an extension to the WEAVER++ model
 of word production (Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer,
 1999). As such, this Stroop model specifies separate
 processing stages for lemma retrieval, word-form
 encoding, etc. Like the Phaf et al. (1990) model, it
 builds in a word-reading advantage by requiring
 fewer processing steps for that task, hence enabling
 different-sized congruency effects between word
 reading and color naming.

2.2. These models’ fits to data

These three models all account for the basic
 results in Fig. 1, but how do they fare in predicting
 other important Stroop results? As mentioned above,
 one critical Stroop manipulation varies SOA. Glaser
 & Glaser’s (1982) Experiment 1 did this by pre-
 senting the two stimulus dimensions spatially sepa-
 rated so that the onset of word and color information
 could be lagged. SOAs were varied from –400 ms
 to +400 ms, where negative SOA means preexpo-
 sure of the irrelevant information. Fig. 2a presents
 these data.

All three models have simulated these data to
 varying degrees of success. They all predict the
 standard Stroop result at 0 SOA, and they all show a
 reduced Stroop effect for color naming at positive
 SOAs, a result that is consistent with the observed
 data. There are several areas of misfit, however. Both
 connectionist models show a small but notable
 congruency effect for word reading at negative
 SOAs, even though this is not present in the data. In
 addition, the Cohen et al. model predicts that, in
 color naming, the congruency effect will be largest at
 negative SOAs, when it is actually reduced here
 relative to 0 SOA. The Roelofs model has neither of
 these problems but fails to fully capture the smooth-
 ness of the increase in interference for color naming
 from –400 to 0 SOA.

The other critical manipulation mentioned above is
 degree of practice. MacLeod and Dunbar (1988)
 devised a clever variant of the Stroop task in which
 they presented stimuli with the key dimensions of
 shape and color and asked participants to either name
 the shape or the color. So that congruency of the



208

209 Fig. 2. Data from Glaser and Glaser (1982) (a) and NJAMOS predictions (b). RTs plotted for color naming (solid symbols) versus word
210 reading (open symbols) and for conflicting (triangle), neutral (circle), and congruent (square) stimuli.

215 shape-color relationship could be varied, the shapes
216 came from a fixed set of unfamiliar shapes, and
217 participants were trained to name each shape with a
218 specific color word (e.g., the irregular hexagon is
219 named 'red'). Manipulating practice involved giving
220 participants 20 sessions of shape training and
221 measuring their Stroop performance along the way.
222 Fig. 3a presents these data.


223 The Cohen et al. (1990) model nicely captures the
224 early (training session 1) pattern of colors interfering
225 with shape naming and not vice versa as well as the
226 late (session 20) pattern of shapes interfering with
227 color naming and hardly vice versa. This reversal is
228 accomplished by the model's weight-learning mech-
229 anism that gradually strengthens the shape-naming
230 pathway with practice. An interesting transition point

231 in the data (session 5) shows considerable interfer-
232 ence for both tasks. However, the Cohen et al. model
233 makes its transition by predicting no interference in
234 either task at this point.

235 Regarding practice effects, the Phaf et al. and
236 Roelofs models are essentially silent. In both, the
237 word-reading advantage is implemented as a qualita-
238 tive change (a 'short cut' for word-reading), and
239 there is no specific learning mechanism presented.

2.3. Summary of existing models

241 To be competitive, any computational model of
242 Stroop effects must demonstrate some added value.
243 What do each of these models offer? The Cohen et
244 al. model offers the best coverage of Stroop-related



212

213 Fig. 3. Data from MacLeod and Dunbar (1988) (a) and NJAMOS predictions (b). In each panel, RTs for shape naming (S) and color
214 naming (C) are plotted separately across congruency and training manipulations.

246 data at present and does so with very simple, natural
 247 connectionist mechanisms for strengthening connect-
 248 ions and gating activation along the two pathways.
 249 This trades off against the model's acknowledged
 250 exclusion of other processes (e.g., habituation,
 251 strategy choice, etc.) that could help address its
 252 known areas of misfit. Note that, while the model
 253 was designed to account for Stroop phenomena per
 254 se, its basic form and mechanisms have been applied
 255 to a slightly broader set of paradigms (Cohen &
 256 Huston, 1994).

257 The Phaf et al. model and the Roelofs model were
 258 both devised to account for Stroop phenomena
 259 within a more general model of a related task. These
 260 models demonstrate how processes that play a
 261 central role in another task can help explain certain
 262 Stroop effects. However, this breadth of application
 263 tends to dilute the models' coverage of Stroop results
 264 themselves, and neither model includes a learning
 265 mechanism that could explain its shortcut pathways
 266 for reading.

267 3. A hybrid model, NJAMOS

268 There are several sources of added value in
 269 NJAMOS. First, it is built within the ACT-R cogni-
 270 tive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), so it
 271 applies a general, pre-specified set of learning and
 272 performance mechanisms to the particulars of the
 273 Stroop paradigm. As such, it has many of the
 274 benefits of a general approach in that the mecha-
 275 nisms that drive its predictions have been shown to
 276 produce accurate predictions for a variety of other
 277 tasks. This general-mechanisms approach also offers
 278 guidance and constraint in developing the specific
 279 task model beyond what the empirical data on that
 280 task can provide, i.e., the model must be built to fit
 281 the relevant data within a given, pre-specified struc-
 282 ture (cf. Newell, 1990).

283 Second, building a specific task model within a
 284 cognitive architecture such as ACT-R still allows
 285 (and arguably facilitates) a focus on capturing as
 286 many experimental results associated with that par-
 287 ticular task as possible. Indeed, with the architecture
 288 taken as given, model development involves specify-
 289 ing the knowledge used in performing the current
 290 task, some of which may come from participants'

291 prior experience and some of which may come from
 292 their exposure to the task itself. Third, NJAMOS is
 293 unique among models of ('low level') attentional
 294 phenomena in that it allows for ('high level')
 295 strategic variability. Evidence suggests that partici-
 296 pants can (and do) apply different strategies when
 297 performing the Stroop task (e.g., Chen & Johnson,
 298 1991; Logan, Zbrodoff & Williamson, 1984, Lovett,
 299 2001). This strategic variation may be considered a
 300 source of qualitative differences in performance from
 301 trial to trial that this model (unlike many others) can
 302 produce. Note that NJAMOS can also produce
 303 quantitative differences in performance from run to
 304 run (i.e., simulated participant to simulated partici-
 305 pant) by varying the ACT-R parameter associated
 306 with individual differences in working memory
 307 capacity (Lovett, Daily & Reder, 2000). The latter
 308 effect maps onto individual differences found in the
 309 Stroop task and will be discussed below.

310 3.1. NJAMOS model overview

311 NJAMOS specifies the knowledge relevant for
 312 performing Stroop-like tasks. In ACT-R, this is
 313 comprised of a set of production rules and a network
 314 of declarative chunks. Each production rule takes the
 315 form 'IF ⟨conditions⟩ THEN ⟨actions⟩' and has an
 316 associated measure of utility. A production rule's
 317 utility is learned through past experiences; it pro-
 318 vides an index of how effective the production rule
 319 has been. In ACT-R, when more than one production
 320 rule's conditions are met, these rules compete on the
 321 basis of their utility values. The production rule with
 322 the highest utility (after some noise is added) is
 323 applied, and its actions are executed. In practice, this
 324 means that the system can learn to choose (and
 325 prefer) more effective strategies.

326 A declarative chunk is represented as a template
 327 with slots for related information. At the sub-sym-
 328 bolic level, each chunk has a base-level activation
 329 representing its overall accessibility. A network of
 330 chunks is specified by directed, pairwise connections,
 331 each with a strength of association. These strengths
 332 influence how strongly one chunk (in the current
 333 focus of attention) cues the availability of another
 334 chunk. The ACT-R equation for total activation of
 335 chunk i is

$$A_i = B_i + SW_j S_{ji}$$

where B_i is the base-level activation of chunk i , W_j is the amount of attention focused on chunk j , and S_{ji} is the strength of association from chunk j to i . This quantity then translates into the chunk's likelihood of being retrieved and latency to retrieval. The latency measure is more relevant in NJAMOS; it follows the following function

$$L_i = F e^{-A_i}$$

where F is a latency-scale factor.

Some specific examples of the knowledge units specified in NJAMOS (and presented in English for readability) are presented in Fig. 4. The first two examples in Fig. 4 are production rules that would initiate processing of the color and word dimensions of the stimulus, respectively. The third example is a declarative chunk representing information about the color black. The last example is a specification of a goal chunk for the color-naming task after the stimulus has been perceived but before any color concept has been retrieved (either by processing the word or the color). In ACT-R, processing is in large part driven by the current goal. The goal is represented like other declarative chunks but it is considered to be the current focus of attention. A fixed, limited amount of source activation (W in ACT-R) is shared among the different slots of the current goal (W_j for each slot). This share of source activation is spread to connected chunks (proportionally to the

strength of the connection) and added to the receiving chunk's base-level activation to comprise that chunk's total activation.


Given this specification of knowledge and ACT-R's fixed mechanisms, two important features of NJAMOS's performance follow. First, production rule choice favors word reading (even when the instructed task is color naming). This is because the word-processing production (see Fig. 4) is general enough that it applies whenever there is a word-like stimulus and because its utility value is taken to be much higher than that for color naming. The generality of the word-reading production rule represents the extensive practice people have with reading that leads words to be processed regardless of the current goal; this kind of general rule could be learned under ACT-R's production-learning mechanism. The higher utility of the word-reading production rule represents the fact that reading often helps people to achieve their goals; ACT-R's utility-learning mechanism would naturally produce this higher value given extensive practice.¹) Production-rule choice provides NJAMOS with a degree of sequentiality as each production rule in this model

¹Note that the model's performance does not require that color naming be constrained by a specific color-task goal. As long as word reading has a higher utility, both word-reading and color-naming productions could fire under a generic goal.


IF the goal involves a color-naming task, and the stimulus color has been encoded,
THEN retrieve the associated color concept.

IF the goal involves processing a stimulus [generic goal] and the stimulus has word-
like qualities, THEN retrieve the associated word concept.

Color-association-chunk1

Stimulus: 
Feature: color
Concept: black

Current-goal

Stimulus-word: "green"
Stimulus-color: 
Task: color


338

339 Fig. 4. Example production rules, chunks, and goal used in NJAMOS (presented in pseudo-code for readability).

412 tends to focus on a single dimension (word or color).
 413 This also provides NJAMOS with strategic variability:
 414 processing of the word may or may not
 415 precede processing of the color under the color-
 416 naming task. Either way, a ‘check’ production works
 417 to verify that the correct dimension has been processed
 418 before enabling a response.

419 Parallel processing also plays a role in producing
 420 the second important feature of NJAMOS performance,
 421 namely, that both dimensions of the stimulus
 422 influence the retrieval of declarative chunks. This is
 423 because all of the slots in the current goal provide
 424 contextual cues to influence the total activation of
 425 to-be-retrieved chunks (see total activation equation).
 426 Some of these slots represent the stimulus features
 427 (word and color); others may represent a concept
 428 retrieved during previous processing (e.g., if the
 429 word were partially processed because the word-
 430 reading production had won over color naming, then
 431 the concept of the word would provide another piece
 432 of context present in the focus of attention during
 433 retrieval of the ink color). Recall that these contextual
 434 effects are proportional to the strengths of
 435 association between the relevant chunks. In
 436 NJAMOS, pairs of chunks that involve the same
 437 color concept (e.g., a color-association chunk for
 438 blue and a word-association chunk for blue) are
 439 given positive strengths of association, and chunks
 440 that involve different color concepts have negative
 441 strengths of association. These positive and negative
 442 strengths contribute to the facilitation and interference
 443 effects. NJAMOS produces larger facilitation
 444 and interference effects in color naming (see Fig. 1)
 445 predominantly because (a) color-association chunks
 446 are given a lower base-level activation which, in the
 447 nonlinear latency equation (see above), makes them
 448 not only slower overall but more sensitive to contextual
 449 cueing and (b) the concept of the word will
 450 often have been retrieved into the goal before
 451 retrieving the color (but not vice versa), magnifying
 452 the contextual effect of the word dimension of the
 453 stimulus.

454 Fig. 5 presents a sketch of the flow of control in
 455 NJAMOS, summarizing these relationships and indicating
 456 other examples of production-rule choice and parallel
 457 chunk retrievals. Note that any branching in this diagram
 458 represents an opportunity for trial-to-trial strategic
 459 variability.



399
 400 Fig. 5. Flow of control in NJAMOS for color naming with
 401 standard stimuli. Lines represent production rules (note choice
 402 points), and ovals represent parallel retrievals that modify the
 403 current focus of attention. From the bottom left oval (*), flow
 404 continues along the dashed line path.

460 3.2. Fitting NJAMOS to the data

461 This section describes how NJAMOS was fit to
 462 five separate experiments comprising a total of 92
 463 data points (including Fig. 1). For ease in estimating
 464 a set of best-fitting parameters, a mathematical
 465 description of NJAMOS was used. The same parameter
 466 settings were used to predict performance across
 467 all five experiments² with the following exceptions.
 468 For each experiment two parameters were varied.
 469 One of these is the latency-scale factor F (see latency
 470 equation above), and the other was a latency intercept.
 471 These parameters appeared necessary to capture
 472 the experiment-to-experiment variation in latencies
 473 that appears even under very similar manipulations
 474 and experimental designs (e.g., compare RTs in Figs.
 475 1 and 6). In addition, in two cases, another single
 476 parameter was varied when needed for a particular
 477 experiment's manipulation; those cases will be discussed
 478 below. To preview the quality of the
 479 NJAMOS fit, all 92 data points were fit by varying a

405 ²Parameters taken as fixed (i.e., not optimized to fit the data)
 406 but whose values departed from ACT-R's default values include
 407 base-level activation for word-association chunks (set at 2) and for
 408 color-association chunks (set at 0), S_{ji} 's between same-color
 409 chunks (set at 1.5), between different-color chunks (set at -1.5),
 410 between same-task chunks (set at 0.6), and between different-task
 411 chunks (set at 0).




Fig. 6. Dunbar and MacLeod (1984) data and model fit.

482
483

484 total of 12 parameters for an R^2 of 0.95 and MSE of
485 1114. In essence, the goal was to test whether
486 NJAMOS can produce reasonable accounts of these
487 experiments without much parameter varying.

488 3.3. Dunbar and MacLeod (1984)

489 Fig. 6 shows the data and NJAMOS predictions
490 for Dunbar and MacLeod's experiment (1984, p. 62).
491 The design is similar to that presented in Fig. 1, with
492 the neutral condition corresponding to 'Neut1' a
493 string of X's for the color-naming task. Both the data
494 and model show the standard Stroop results. As
495 discussed above, NJAMOS shows little facilitation
496 or interference in word reading because the parallel
497 retrieval process in this task is based on retrieval of
498 highly practiced word-reading chunks whose base-
499 level activations are little affected by added con-
500 textual activation. In contrast, the lower base-level
501 activations of color-naming chunks are significantly
502 impacted by spreading activation (positive/facilitat-
503 ory or negative/inhibitory) from elements currently
504 in the focus of attention (e.g., the word stimulus or
505 even the word-concept already retrieved). This dif-
506 ferential effect of added contextual activation on
507 word-reading chunks versus color-naming chunks
508 highlights the nonlinear relationship between activa-
509 tion and retrieval latency which is pre-specified in
510 ACT-R (see latency equation above).

511 3.4. Glaser and Glaser (1982)

512 Fig. 2b shows the predictions of NJAMOS for the
513 Glaser and Glaser (1982) experiment described
514 above. Unlike previous models, NJAMOS appears to
515 capture (at least qualitatively) three effects in the
516 data: (1) no congruency effect for word reading at
517 any SOA, (2) increase in overall latency for color
518 naming as SOA goes from -400 to 0 , and (3)
519 increase and then decrease in interference effects
520 from -400 to 0 to $+400$ SOA. Much of this match
521 to the data is driven by the model's tendency to
522 choose word reading first, even on color naming
523 trials. Note, however, that the size of the interference
524 effect is not monotonically increasing from -400 to
525 0 as it is in the data and the facilitation effect in
526 color naming is overpredicted. Under the parameter-
527 fitting constraints applied here (2 free parameters for
528 this set of data), this is not too surprising. The fit can
529 be improved by allowing more parameters to vary
530 (e.g., informal sensitivity analyses revealed that
531 modifying one or two S_{ji} values has an impact).

532 3.5. MacLeod and Dunbar (1988)

533 Fig. 3b presents the NJAMOS predictions for
534 MacLeod and Dunbar's (1988) experiment. Note that
535 this is a case where an additional parameter was
536 required by the design of the experiment, namely, the
537 initial base-level activation for the shape-name-as-

sociation chunks was fit for this experiment alone (because no other experiments employed the novel shape-naming task). From this initial value, ACT-R's learning mechanism naturally increased this base-level activation as the model received additional practice by retrieving the shape-name-association chunks during training. Note that these increases in base-level activation make the shape chunks less and less susceptible to context effects (just as the model fit above demonstrated with high base-level activations for word-association chunks). Also, NJAMOS can learn to adjust its strategy of trying to name the color first (regardless of task) as the two competing (shape and color-processing) productions adjust their utilities. Indeed, over time, the model learns to process shape information first, rather than color information. This increases the proportion of trials in which shape information is present in the goal and can serve as a source of contextual activation impacting (usually inhibiting in the case of conflict stimuli) the task of color naming.

NJAMOS shows three main results in this experiment: (1) at session 1, there is more interference and facilitation in shape naming than in color naming, (2) at session 5, there is some facilitation and interference in both tasks, and (3) at session 20, there is more facilitation and interference in color naming than shape naming. Note that the Cohen et al. model captured only the first and third of these. Nevertheless, NJAMOS appears to have difficulty capturing the increase in the interference effect for color naming between sessions 1 and 5. This is probably caused by the model's overprediction of interference for color naming in session 1 (30 ms in the predictions versus 5 ms in the data). It is possible that adjusting the production utility parameters would address this issue, but as mentioned above, the motivation for the current model fits was to demonstrate that NJAMOS could produce reasonable model fits with a relatively small number of free parameters.

3.6. Cohen et al. (1992)

Table 1 presents Stroop data from schizophrenic patients and matched controls along with the NJAMOS predictions. The main result is a larger interference effect (for color naming) among the

Table 1
Data and model fit to schizophrenic data summarized in Cohen et al. (1992)

	Neut.-word	Neut.-color	Conf.-color
Patient data	530	797	1467
Control data	420	603	1037
Patient pred.	456	764	1345
Control pred.	440	661	1137

patients. While schizophrenia is a very complex condition, it is associated with a deficit in working memory. To capture this NJAMOS simply uses an adjusted W parameter. This was the extra parameter varied to fit these data. As the table shows, reducing W produces the effect as well as raising RTs among the patients. Notice that in the total activation equation above, a reduced W lower the activation of target chunks (relative to control participants with $W=1$). For word reading, this does not have much of an effect on the latency measure because of its nonlinearity, but for color naming, this difference between controls and patients is accentuated by the nonlinearity of the retrieval latency function.

4. Conclusions

The above model fits demonstrate that NJAMOS can fit a variety of Stroop results, when constrained by the ACT-R architecture and a limited number of free parameters. In many other, less studied paradigms, such a demonstration of a single model's fit to five separate experiments might offer an adequate account of the phenomenon. In the case of Stroop, however, there are many more results associated with the paradigm. MacLeod's (1991) review of the Stroop literature lists 18 key results that may serve as a core, but even that is a distillation of the many, varied manipulations — and corresponding results — this paradigm has wrought. This leads to a tension in model development and evaluation: How to balance a model's coverage of the broad span of Stroop results with its parsimony? An added dimension of evaluation that cognitive architectures have added to the mix is whether the model itself is a part of a broader system that can account for more than behavior in Stroop tasks?

NJAMOS aspires for all of these desiderata:

633 coverage, parsimony, and generality. At this point,
 634 its coverage is not yet large, but it is growing. For
 635 example, semantic gradient effects (e.g., Dalrymple-
 636 Alford, 1972) and trial-type frequency effects (e.g.,
 637 Tzelgov, Henik & Berger, 1992) can be captured
 638 under its existing mechanisms. Its parsimony may be
 639 measured by the relatively small proportion of free
 640 parameters or by the small set of productions and
 641 chunks required to specify the model's incoming
 642 knowledge. Its generality is represented by the many
 643 related models that have been built within the ACT-
 644 R architecture using only different starting knowl-
 645 edge sets (where different knowledge is required for
 646 performing different experimental tasks). That is, the
 647 learning and performance mechanisms used by
 648 NJAMOS were not built for this Stroop model alone
 649 but rather have been used and tested in a wide range
 650 of models covering a broad spectrum of cognitive
 651 tasks.

652 That said, it is still quite difficult to generate
 653 adequate quantitative measures of coverage, par-
 654 simony, and generality that can be used to make
 655 across-model comparisons. For example, not all
 656 models will be set the task of fitting the same body
 657 of results, and in the case of Stroop, there are many
 658 different subsets of this large literature. One reason-
 659 able approach exemplified in MacLeod's review is to
 660 use a fixed set of results (i.e., the eighteen listed in
 661 that paper's appendix) for a standardized comparison
 662 of current models. But when the distinctions between
 663 model fits come to quantitative, not just qualitative,
 664 differences, this requires that all the modelers take
 665 the same fixed set of results to heart and do the work
 666 of fitting. Unfortunately, even in that best case
 667 scenario, comparisons will be complicated by the
 668 question of whether all results should be treated as
 669 equally important. And, then, there is the issue of
 670 adjusting a model's goodness of fit for its level of
 671 complexity. Here, the dimension of parsimony must
 672 come into play, but there is no gold standard for
 673 measurement, and the process of comparing model
 674 complexity is almost impossible in the case of
 675 models built within different frameworks (e.g., con-
 676 nectionist versus hybrid). Instead of giving up in
 677 light of these challenges, the best course may be to
 678 use the vast Stroop literature as an impetus for
 679 aiming to understand not only how well a given
 680 model can capture a given result but why.

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